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Abstract. In role-based access control models, delegation of authority
involves delegating roles that a user can assume or the set of permis-
sions that he can acquire, to other users. Several role-based delegation
models have been proposed in the literature. However, these models con-
sider only delegation in presence of the role type, which have some in-
herent limitations to task delegation in workflow systems. In this pa-
per, we address task delegation in a workflow and elaborate a security
model supporting delegation constraints. Delegation constraints express
security requirements with regards to task’s resources, user’s assignment
and privileges (delegation of authority). Further, we show how, using a
role-based security model, we inject formalised delegation constraints to
compute delegation principals with their respective privileges.
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1 Introduction
With the broad adoption of workflow management systems to model and au-
tomate business processes cross organisations, security becomes a crucial and
essential topic. Typically, activities that are part of a process are represented as
tasks. Organisations establish a set of authorisation policies that regulate how
business processes and resources should be managed within a workflow [1]. Au-
thorisation information is given which authorises users to perform tasks. Such
authorisation information may be specified using a simple access control list or
more complex role-based structures [2].
In current workflow management systems, the role-based access control
(RBAC) model is widely adopted, where system administrators assign roles to
users. It is more convenient for administrators to manage roles than to manage
users directly [3]. One important factor that affects access control (authorisa-
tion) distribution among users is delegation. Delegation involves a user passing
its authority to other users. If delegation is allowed, a delegator delegates au-
thority (a privilege) to another active entity, called the delegatee, to carry out a
2 Khaled Gaaloul et al.
task on behalf of the former. In the context of workflow systems, delegation can
be very useful for real-world situations where a user who has to perform a task
is either unavailable or too overloaded [4]. Hence, we define task delegation as a
means for assigning a task and its access rights from a delegator to a delegatee.
The concept of delegation has been presented in [1, 5]. Significant contribu-
tions to role-based delegation can be found in [6, 7]. While much of the work
in the area of delegation is limited to role-based access control, the goal of our
paper is to consider task delegation constraints in workflow systems. Delegation
constraints needs to tackle several issues with regards to workflow’s invariants
in terms of users, tasks and resources. In doing so, we need to come up with an
access control model supporting the assignment of task delegation. Delegation as-
signment deals with delegation principals (delegator, delegatee) their respective
rights (privileges) and their availability (no conflicts during task assignment). In
this paper, we extend the RBAC model of Sandhu et al. in two directions: (i)
our formal security model defines a Task-oriented Access Control (TAC) model
which is capable of supporting task assignment condition in workflows and (ii) we
leverage TAC specifications to inject delegation constraints, thereby computing
potential delegatees and their required privileges.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 defines work-
flow authorisation constraints during task execution. In section 3, we present a
formal security model to reason about task assignment within a workflow. This
model is used in Section 4 to integrate delegation constraints in order to com-
pute delegatees with their respective privileges. Finally, we conclude and discuss
future work.
2 Workflow Authorisation Constraints
A workflow comprises various activities that are involved in a business process.
Activities that are part of a process are represented as tasks [8]. Authorisation
information is given which authorises users to perform tasks. Such authorisation
information may be specified using a simple access control list or more complex
role-based structures [9].
We define a task execution model using an activity diagram composed of
three main activities : Initialisation, Processing and Finalisation (see Fig. 1).
During the initialisation of the task, a task instance is created and then assigned
to a user. During task processing, the assigned user can start or delegate the
task which gathers all operations and rights over the business objects related to
task’s resources (see Definition 1). Finally, the task finalisation would notice the
workflow management system that the task is terminated, where termination
defines completeness, failure or cancellation.
Seeing a task as a block that needs protection against undesired accesses,
the activity diagram includes an access control transition which is in charge of
granting access to a task. Access control defines a transition from the creation of
a task to its assignment to a user. This assignment will lead to the processing or












Fig. 1. Task execution model.
the cancellation of a task. Cancellation can be triggered when an assigned user
does not fulfill the required authorisation to execute a task.
Definition 1 (Permission). P is a set of permissions. P defines the right to
execute an operation on a resource type. A permission p is a pair (f,o) where f
is a function and o is a business object. We note : P ∈ F × O where F is a set
of functions and O is a set of business objects.
Authorisation information define the access control transition. We define a
permission as an authorisation allowing a users to perform a task. Authorisation
makes an explicit binding between a user, a task resource (business object) and
his rights over it (fuction/action). In our work, we define a task oriented access
control model based on the RBAC model. We focus on task’s requirements to
analyse and specify security constraints while accessing workflow’s data. Data
access defines permissions on business objects related to task’s resources.
3 Task-oriented Access Control Model
We propose a Task-oriented Access Control (TAC) model to support authorisa-
tion requirements in workflow systems (see Fig. 2). Authorisation information
will be inferred from access control data structures, such as user-role assignment
(URA) and task-role assignment (TRA) relations. In addition, we model per-
mission assignment relations for tasks and roles in order to support the task
execution context. The remaining relations are generic relations based on the
RBAC model [3].
Formally, we define sets U, R, OU, T, P, S and TI as a set of users, roles,
organisations units, tasks, permissions, subjects and task instances, respectively.
We use a subject to denote the time a user selects roles for a session. During
the task instantiation assignment, we create a user’s current active role set and
define it as a subject (see Fig. 2). For example, the user Alice with the role clerk
defines a subject to execute the instance of a task “Check credit” in a bank loan
process.
We define RH (Role Hierarchy), where RH is a partial order on R, ri and
rj ∈ R. RH denotes that ri is a role superior to rj , as a result, ri automatically
inherits the permissions of rj .
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Fig. 2. Task-oriented access control (TAC) model.
We define RM (Role Mapping), where RM ⊆ OUi × OUj with OUi and
OUj two organisations units. RM defines external roles accessing distributed re-
sources cross-organisations. It provides a decentralised access control mechanism
where externally known roles are publicly available :
rk ∈ OUi and rl ∈ OUj , RM denotes that rl is a role mapped to rk, as a result,
rl shares the permissions of rk.
3.1 Definitions of map relations
Formally, we define sets of relations as follows:
– URA ⊆ U ×R, the user role assignment relation mapping users to roles they
are member of.
– RPA ⊆ R × P , the permission role assignment relation mapping roles to
permissions they are authorised to.
– TPA ⊆ T × P , the task permission assignment relation mapping tasks to
permissions. This defines the set of permission required to execute a task (see
Definition 2).
– TRA ⊆ T × R the task role assignment relation mapping roles to tasks they
are assigned to.
3.2 Definitions of functions
Formally, we define sets of functions as follows:
– SU :S → U a function mapping a subject to the corresponding user.
– SR:S → R, a function mapping each subject to a role, where SR(s) =
r, (SU(s), r) ∈ URA} with a subject s having a permission p|(r, p) ∈ RPA}.
– instanceof :TI → T , a function mapping a task instance to its task type.
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– claimedby:TI → S, a function mapping a task instance to a subject to execute
it. It defines the user-task assignment condition s = claimedby(ti1) where :
{ti = instanceof (ti1), (r, u) ∈ URA|(SR(s) = r
∧
SU(s) = u), (ti, r) ∈
TRA}.
3.3 Definitions of constraints
Here we discuss Separation of duty (SoD) and Binding of duty (BoD) constraints.
It defines security constraints between two tasks that compose a business pro-
cess [10]. Such constraints help to verify whether a user is not allowed to execute
a task due to some conflicts (e.g., conflict of interest). We define an exclusive
relation between tasks for SoD, and a binding relation between tasks for BoD :
TTSOD : {(ti, tj) ∈ T × T | ti is exclusive with tj}
TTBOD : {(ti, tj) ∈ T × T | ti is binding with tj}
If (ti, tj) ∈ TTSOD, then ti and tj cannot be assigned to the same user.
If (ti, tj) ∈ TTBOD, then ti and tj must be assigned to the same user which
defines a binding relation between two tasks.
3.4 Model contributions
The main contribution of the TAC model is to specify the task assignment
relation where two conditions have to be verified: (1) the first condition is related
to task’s resources requirements. The role’s permissions defined in RPA (role-
permission assignment) needs to satisfy the permissions defined in TPA (task-
permission assignment). (2) the task is executed if and only if the user/role is
assigned to it. Basically, having a permission to execute a task but not being
assigned to it will not satisfy the outlined conditions and, therefore, will deny
the access to task resources.
Definition 2 (Task Assignment). A task instance ti is assigned to a user u
with an active subject s if and only if :
(t, r) ∈ TRA⇒ {p ∈ P |(t, p) ∈ TPA} ⊆ {p|(r, p) ∈ RPA}∧ claimedby(ti) = s,
where (SR(s) = r
∧
SU(s) = u).
The user-task assignment requires the claimedby function. For instance, a
task ti is assigned a set of permissions based on the TPA relation in order to
carry out this task. A user u1 with a role rj is assigned to ti if and only if
u1 verifies the TRA and claimedby conditions. However, if we consider another
user u2 member of same role rj having the same permissions based on the RPA
relation but u2 is not defined in claimedby(ti), which means not assigned to this
task. In this case, u2 is not allowed to execute ti since he does not fulfill the
user-task assignment relation (see condition 2).
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In the loan process example, let user Bob a member of role Clerk but not from
the same bank agency. Bob is not allowed to perform the task “Check credit”
since he is not assigned by the system to execute it. Within organisations, users
can share different roles but are not assigned to the same tasks. This is due to
privacy and security constraints such as the separation of duty. Therefore, we
leverage condition 2 as an additional constraint when claiming a task instance
by a user.
In the next section, we leverage the user-task assignment conditions to sup-
port task delegation assignment with regards to the delegatees and its required
privileges.
4 Access Control Over Delegation using TAC
Delegation is a mechanism that permits a user to assign a subset of his assigned
authorisations (privileges) to other users who currently do not possess it.
Definition 3 (Delegation Relation). We define a delegation relation DR ⊆
T×U×U×2DC where T a set of tasks, U a set of users and DC a set of delegation
constraints. A task delegation relation is defined as DR = (t,u1,u2,{DC}), t is
the delegated task and t ∈ T, u1 the delegator and u2 the delegatee ∈ U.
For instance, delegation constraints (DC) can be related to time or evidence
specifications [4]. In addition, organisational constraints regarding roles mapping
cross organisations or role hierarchies within an organisation define user-to-user
delegation constraints (see RM and RH relations of the TAC model in Fig. 2).
For instance, a subordinate in an organisation hierarchy can act on behalf of his
superior where the latter is the delegator and the former is the delegatee.
Here, a delegation relation defines the main constraints to be considered when
delegating privileges with regards to users/roles, task and resources. Our focus
is to integrate such constraints in a secure manner. In doing so, we leverage the
TAC (task-oriented access control) model specifications to compute delegatees
and privileges. The TAC model allows to compute the list of potential delega-
tees using the RPA (role-permission assignment) relation that may satisfy the
delegated task requirements based on the TPA (task-permission assignment) re-
lation. In doing so, we define a method for access control over task delegation
using TAC. In the following, we detail our method and describe how valid dele-
gatees are checked and whether they need delegated privileges grant.
Input: u1, u2 ∈ U ; r1, r2 ∈ R; ti, tj ∈ T.
1. Defining the role and permission assignments for each user (URA and RPA);
2. Instantiating the task ti1 and assigning it to the delegator s1 who is the
current user u1;
3. Checking security constraints before delegation (SoD and BoD);
4. Computing the delegatee s2, who is the current user u2, based on his per-
missions assignment ((ti, pr2) ∈ TPA) or;
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5. Granting privileges for s2 based on the task instance permissions assignment
(p′r2 ← pr2 ∪ pti) which is defined in the claimedby function;
Output: Delegation relation instance : dr1 = (ti1,s1,s2,{DC});
The main contribution of this method is to specify the delegated task assign-
ment conditions based on Definition 2. If the two conditions are satisfied, then
the task ti is delegated to the delegatee u2. However, if u2 does not have the
permission required and there is no conflicts (BoD or SoD) to execute ti. Then
the delegated privileges are granted for u2 based on the claimedby function.
The computation of the privileges is based on the TRA and claimedby spec-
ifications defined in our TAC model (see claimedby condition for permissions).
Basically, we provide a method to compute the least privileges to delegate based
on the current requirements of the task instances ti1 which is generated from
the delegated task. At this stage, delegated privileges are done manually sup-
porting a user-to-user delegation. However, the administration of new access
rights has to be specified later on into authorisation policies in a compliant and
dynamic manner. Authorisation policies will regulate how the business process
and resources should be managed when delegating a task within a workflow.
Delegation policies are not discussed in this paper due to space restrictions.
5 Related Work
Barka et al. proposed a role-based delegation model based on the RBAC model.
Their unit of delegation is a role. Authors focused also on role-based models
supporting role hierarchies when studying delegation in the context of both
RBAC0 model (flat roles) and RBAC1 model (hierarchical roles) of the RBAC96
family [6]. However, users may want to delegate a piece of permission which is not
supported in such models. This is the case when computing delegated privileges.
Task-based access control (TBAC) aims to provide a task context during
permission assignments [11]. A workflow system consisting of tasks is assumed.
Each of these tasks is then assigned a “protection state”, providing information
as to who gets to have which permission on a task basis. According to the current
state of the workflow system moving through the process instance, different
permission assignments are activated or deactivated as ordered by the protection
state. The TBAC design is process oriented, however, ignoring human-centric
interactions such as user-to-user delegation.
Team based access control (TMAC) is an access control scheme similar to
RBAC, but it provides the assignment of both users and permissions to teams
[12]. Each team then is bound to the task it was created for. At runtime, more
than one team can be created out of the same template, but each team will be
working on a different task instance and accordingly will need access to different
object instances. TMACmodel is out of the scope of this paper where we consider
constraints on tasks and users rather than a team.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we integrated task delegation constraints into a formal security
model. In doing so, we analysed task authorisation constraints to support se-
curity requirements for delegation. We defined a Task-oriented Access Control
(TAC) model to support access control over task delegation in workflow systems.
Moreover, we presented a method to compute potential delegatees and their del-
egated privileges. In future work we plan to examine the XACML (eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language) standard for the TAC model to support task
delegation constraints in particular and authorisation policies in general.
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